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12. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Assessing the systems of controls 
of the European Fisheries Control 
Agency’s inspecting powers
Federica Cacciatore and Mariolina Eliantonio1
1. INTRODUCTION. THE EUROPEAN FISHERIES 
CONTROL AGENCY’S OVERALL MISSION AND 
TASKS
The European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) is an EU agency based in 
Vigo. Established by Regulation 768/2005, recently codified in Regulation 
2019/4732 (hereinafter, Regulation 473), following an agreement of 2002, its 
1 This chapter is a result of a common undertaking. However, Section 2 and 
Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 can be directly attributed to Federica Cacciatore; Section 1 
and Subsections 3.4 and 3.5 can be directly attributed to Mariolina Eliantonio; finally, 
Sections 3 and 4 contain common reflections.
2 Regulation (EU) 2019/473 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
March 2019 on the European Fisheries Control Agency (codification), OJ L 83. The 
former baseline regulation was Council Regulation (EC) 768/2005 of 26 April 2005 
establishing a European Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation (EEC) 
2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy, OJ L 
128. The regulation was amended twice. First, by Council Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 
of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compli-
ance with the rules of the common fisheries policy […], OJ L 343, in the context of 
the new control regime for the CFP, and then by Regulation (EU) 2016/1626 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency, OJ L 
251, to increase EU cooperation on coast guard functions and to strengthen coopera-
tion between EFCA, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). For more on this, see F. Cacciatore, M. 
Eliantonio, ‘Fishing in troubled waters? Shared enforcement of the Common Fisheries 
Policy and accountability gaps’, in M. Scholten, M. Luchtman (eds.), Law Enforcement 
by EU Authorities. Implications for Political and Judicial Accountability, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, 168–194. See also S. Eliasen, T. Hegland, J. Raakjar 
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main mission is ‘to promote the highest common standards for control, inspec-
tion and surveillance under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)’.3 Later, 
Regulation 1224/20094 (hereinafter, Control Regulation) established a Union 
control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the CFP.
Before an autonomous and comprehensive CFP was adopted, fisheries were 
regulated within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), launched in 1962.5 It 
was in 1983 that a first step towards a CFP was taken.6 From then on, the CFP 
was increasingly developed, and growing regulatory powers previously in the 
hands of Member States were shifted to the EU level. They were mainly aimed 
at establishing fishing standards and maximum quotas to safeguard biodiver-
sity and competitiveness. Nevertheless, while rules were established at the 
EU level, often they were not satisfactorily implemented at the national level, 
either because regulatees were not compliant or because Member States did 
not properly oversee how these rules were complied with.7 Therefore, a quest 
for stronger control over the CFP effectiveness emerged,8 which led to major 
policy reforms.9 In particular, the Commission issued a Green Paper10 contain-
ing its proposals for the reform of the CFP. Among these was the introduction 
(2015), ‘Decentralising: the implementation of regionalization and co-management 
under the post-2013 Common Fisheries Policy’, Marine Policy, 62: 224; M. Salomon, 
T. Markus, M. Dross (2014), ‘Masterstroke or paper tiger – the reform of the EU’s 
Common Fisheries Policy’, Marine Policy, 47: 76; J. Wakefield, Reforming the 
Common Fisheries Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016.
3 https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ objectives -and -strategy. 
4 See note 2 above.
5 See https:// ec .europa .eu/ info/ food -farming -fisheries/ key -policies/ common 
-agricultural -policy/ cap -glance _en. 
6 Cacciatore and Eliantonio (note 2 above) 168ff.
7 T. Gray, J. Hatchard (2003), ‘The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’s 
system of governance – rhetoric or reality?’, Marine Policy, 27(6): 545–554; J.-M. 
DaRocha, S. Cerviño, S. Villasante (2012), ‘The Common Fisheries Policy: an enforce-
ment problem’, Marine Policy, 36(6): 1309–1314. For an overview of the different out-
comes of the CFP throughout the EU, see M. Hadjimichael, G. Edwards-Jones, M.J. 
Kaiser (2010), ‘Distribution of the burden of fisheries regulations in Europe: the north/
south divide’, Marine Policy, 34: 795–802. 
8 W. Battista, R.P. Kelly, A. Erickson, R. Fujita (2018), ‘Fisheries governance 
affecting conservation outcomes in the United States and European Union’, Coastal 
Management, 46(2): 388–452. 
9 C. Johnson (2008), ‘Fisheries enforcement in European Community waters since 
2002 – developments in non-flag enforcement’, The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, 23: 249–270; D. Symes (2009), ‘Reform of the European Union’s 
Common Fisheries Policy: making fisheries management work’, Fisheries Research, 
100(2): 100. 
10 COM(2001) 135 final, ‘Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries 
policy’, Brussels, 20/03/2001.
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The European Fisheries Control Agency’s inspecting powers 217
of a decentralized enforcement system, according to which powers should be 
delegated to the lowest competent level of governance,11 and the establishment 
of an EU-level ad hoc agency, with coordinating powers over the control and 
inspection activities within the CFP. The agency, formerly named Community 
Fisheries Control Agency (later renamed European Fisheries Control Agency 
(EFCA)), was established in 2005 by Regulation 768/2005 and was attributed 
the main task to ‘coordinate control and inspection by Member States relating 
to the control and inspection obligations of the Community’.12 Its competences 
were further enlarged in 2009,13 especially in the field of on-site inspections, 
thus taking a further step towards verticalization of enforcement powers, as 
well as regulatory ones. After that, in 2012–2013, another major revision 
provided the regions with more effective powers in the CFP’s implementation 
phase.14
As already mentioned, the primary role of EFCA is to coordinate the control 
and inspection operations and foster cooperation among Member States in 
order to improve the implementation of and compliance with the CFP.
EFCA carries out various tasks in the field of fisheries and, in order to 
achieve its goals, it is endowed with different types of powers. First, there are 
advisory powers towards the Commission in regulatory matters when it comes 
to fisheries-related issues. Second, there are enforcement powers, in that it 
may conduct, on the one hand, direct inspections of Union fishing vessels 
outside Union waters, according to Article 79 of the Control Regulation, by 
means of Union inspectors and, on the other hand, it may ensure operational 
coordination between the EU and the Member States, in relation to information 
sharing, assistance, and inspecting activities related to the Specific Control 
and Inspection Programmes (SCIPs) which the Commission sets up in the 
sphere of fisheries. Third, EFCA also plays a key role in setting up the Joint 
Deployment Plans (JDPs), the main implementing tool for SCIPs; and, finally, 
11 In 2002 a Regulation was adopted with this aim (Council Regulation 2371/2002 
on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the 
Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 358). On the benefits of regionalization, see also H. 
Österblom, M. Sissenwine, D. Symes, M. Kadin, T. Daw, C. Folke (2011), ‘Incentives, 
social-ecological feedbacks and European fisheries’, Marine Policy, 35: 568–574; J. 
Raakjær (2011), ‘The EU Common Fisheries Policy – a fisheries management system 
that has failed!’, Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section C – Food and Economics, 
8(2): 105–113.
12 Art. 3(a) of Regulation 473.
13 Council Regulation 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for 
ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, OJ L 343.
14 Regulation 1379/2013 on the Common organisation of the markets in fishery and 
aquaculture products, OJ L 354. For more info, see Salomon, Markus, Dross (note 2 
above) 76–84.
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it supports the EU and national actors in research and development in the area 
of fisheries.
In this chapter, we will focus on EFCA’s inspection-related competences, 
which are of various types and involve different actors (EU and national), with 
a view to analysing the system of controls therein. This analysis is based on 
the relevant legislative provisions as well as on reports and other documents by 
EFCA itself and the Commission.
2. EFCA’S INSPECTION-RELATED POWERS
Inspections play a fundamental role in order for the EU to keep control over 
policy implementation and the degree of compliance with it. In the case of 
fisheries, inspection powers are shared between the European and national 
level, in the typical ‘web’ of relationships characterizing the system of ‘shared 
administration’.15 EFCA, previously charged with mostly coordinating func-
tions, nowadays also enjoys shared enforcement powers.16
Regarding its inspection-related tasks, according to Regulation 473, EFCA 
carries out the following activities: (a) coordination of and assistance in 
national inspections; (b) training and coordination of inspectors; (c) direct 
inspections; (d) inspection operations involving third countries. These aspects 
are described in detail below, where the role played by the other EU and 
national relevant actors is also scrutinized where relevant. At the end of the 
section, these findings are summarized in Table 12.1.
2.1 Coordination of and Assistance in National Inspections
Pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 473, EFCA is in charge of coordinating and 
controlling inspections which Member States carry out under the CFP (Article 
3(a)); it also coordinates the deployment of national means of control and 
inspections (Article 3(b)). The Agency also assists Member States in reporting 
information related to the inspections to the Commission and third parties 
15 See on this concept e.g. J.H. Jans, S. Prechal, R. Widdershoven (eds.), 
Europeanisation of Public Law, 2nd edn, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2015.
16 Among shared enforcement powers (Cacciatore and Eliantonio, note 2 above), 
we may distinguish a sub-category represented by networked powers, consisting of 
more collaborative forms of enforcement between Member States and the EU authori-
ties, which may not always be structured and operating pursuant (only) to legal norms, 
nor do they always involve an active role for traditional EU institutions or for the ad hoc 
agencies. See further F. Cacciatore and M. Eliantonio (2019), ‘Networked enforcement 
in the Common Fisheries Policy through data sharing: Is there room left for traditional 
accountability paradigms?’, European Journal of Risk Regulation, 10(3): 522.
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The European Fisheries Control Agency’s inspecting powers 219
(Article 3(c)) and assists Member States to fulfil their tasks and obligations 
pursuant to the rules of the CFP (Article 3(d)).
In particular, whereas the Commission establishes the SCIPs in the CFP 
framework in cooperation with Member States in accordance with Article 95 
of Regulation 1224/2009, EFCA is attributed, according to Articles 5 and 10 
of Regulation 473, the key task of implementing them through the adoption of 
JDPs, whose content is laid down in Article 11 of Regulation 473. Currently 
there are four JDPs: Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic (adopted in 2014 and 
involving nine countries), Baltic Sea, North Sea (both operating since 2007 
and both involving eight countries) and Western Waters (established in 2012 
and concerning 12 countries).17
Pursuant to its task to ‘assist Member States’ as they carry out their tasks 
under the CFP, EFCA’s members also participate in joint inspections con-
ducted according to the JDPs, playing a coordinating role.18
EFCA may also be requested to take up coordinating tasks in those fisheries 
or fishing areas which are not subject to a SCIP: Article 16 of Regulation 
473 establishes that two or more Member States may agree to ask for such 
coordination of their means of control and inspection, according to criteria and 
priorities previously agreed between the countries concerned. An example is 
the recent operational plan named ‘Black Sea’, in force since 2012, to provide 
specific assistance to Bulgaria and Romania for joint inspection and control 
activities of turbot fisheries in the Black Sea.19
2.2 Training and Coordination of Inspectors
Besides its coordinating functions, EFCA is also endowed with training func-
tions for national and Union inspectors. Article 3 of Regulation 473 specifies 
that the Agency must contribute to the coordination of inspector training and 
the exchange of experience between Member States (Article 3(g)), and to 
research and development activities in that field (Article 3(f)). Article 7 lists 
a series of specific tasks within EFCA’s overall assistance role, among which 
are the establishment and development of a core curriculum for the training 
of the instructors of the fisheries inspectorate of the Member States and of the 
EU inspectors and provision of ‘additional training courses and seminars to 
17 More information is available on EFCA’s website: https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ 
en/ content/ joint -deployment -plans -eu -waters. 
18 See, for example, EFCA (2019), Annual Report 2018, Vigo, European Fisheries 
Control Agency: 152 (about EFCA’s participation in the JDP Mediterranean during 
2018).
19 For further details, see https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ other 
-coordination. See also ibid., 19.
Scholten, M., & Brenninkmeijer, A. (Eds.). (2020). Controlling eu agencies : The rule of law in a multi-jurisdictional legal order.
         ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a>





































those officials and other personnel involved in control and inspection activ-
ities’. EFCA may also, on request from the Commission or Member States, 
develop common inspection methodologies and procedures and draw up joint 
operational procedures in relation to joint control and inspection activities 
undertaken by two or more Member States (Article 7(g)); it may also issue 
manuals on harmonized standards of inspections (Article 20).
In 2018 EFCA organized 35 training events, involving 1,496 participants 
overall.20 EFCA has also delivered training manuals and guidelines, both for 
EU and non-EU fishing inspectors, that are available (only for staff members) 
on its website.21
2.3 Direct Inspections
Pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation 473, EFCA officials, acting as Union 
inspectors, may carry out direct inspections in international waters on behalf 
of the EU22 in accordance with Article 79 of the Control Regulation. According 
to the latter, the Commission establishes a list of Union inspectors, who may 
conduct inspections in Union waters and on Union fishing vessels outside 
Union waters, either in the framework of SCIPs or international fisheries 
control programmes, where the EU is under an obligation to provide for con-
trols. Therefore, Union inspectors may either be EFCA or Commission staff 
members.
At present, 18 Union inspectors are members of EFCA.23 They act pur-
suant to the criteria laid down in the Commission Implementing Regulation 
404/2011.24 During 2018 EFCA’s Union inspectors carried out, in the context 
of the four ongoing JDPs, 176 out of the total of 3,119 sea inspections, corre-
sponding to 5.6 per cent of the total inspections.25
20 Ibid., 161.
21 https:// training .efca .europa .eu/ login/ index .php.
22 Another EU authority playing an active role in on-site inspections is e.g. ESMA 
(see Chapter 15 by van Rijsbergen and Simoncini, section 1.2). 
23 C(2018) 6641 final, Annex to the Commission implementing Decision estab-
lishing the list of Union inspectors who may carry out inspections pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Brussels, 15.10.2018.
24 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 404/2011 of 8 April 2011 laying 
down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 
establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 112.
25 EFCA (2019) (note 18 above) 109ff.
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The European Fisheries Control Agency’s inspecting powers 221
2.4 Inspection Operations Involving Third Countries
At the Commission’s request, pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation 473, EFCA 
may also assist the EU and Member States in their relations with third parties 
and regional international fisheries organizations of which the EU is a member, 
and cooperate with the competent authorities of regional international fisheries 
organizations regarding the control and inspection obligations of the EU in 
the framework of working arrangements concluded with such bodies. EFCA 
may also cooperate with the competent authorities of third countries in matters 
relating to control and inspection in the framework of agreements concluded 
between the EU and such third countries.
Currently, EFCA is engaged in four different operations involving third 
countries: the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC); the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO); the General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM); and the International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
The main programming instrument for operations with third countries is 
again represented by the JDPs26 that EFCA adopts with the Member States 
involved. In the cases of NEAFC and NAFO, two ad hoc JDPs were adopted, 
whereas GFCM and ICCAT are set up under the framework of already existing 
JDPs: the Mediterranean for the former, Mediterranean and Black Sea opera-
tional plan for the latter.
Within the NEAFC, in 2018 EFCA deployed 16 man-days to participate in 
joint teams at sea.27 Regarding the NAFO, it deployed 93 man-days in joint 
teams at sea and 22 in mixed teams ashore.28 In the case of ICCAT, EFCA 
participated in 34 joint inspections in the Strait of Sicily from 2 July to 20 
August 2018.29
3. CONTROL MECHANISMS FOR EFCA’S 
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
EFCA, in carrying out its inspection-related activities (either directly or indi-
rectly, through coordination or training of national inspectors, or jointly with 
national and third-country inspectors), is acting upon a delegation from the 
26 Information about the JDPs regulating operational activities for NEAFC, NAFO, 
GFCM and ICCAT are available, respectively, at: https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ 
content/ neafc; https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ nafo; https:// www .efca .europa 
.eu/ en/ content/ gfcm; https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ iccat. 
27 EFCA (2019) (note 18 above) 150ff.
28 Ibid., 147.
29 Ibid., 33.
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Table 12.1 EFCA’s inspection-related tasks and corresponding outputs
Inspection-related tasks Outputs
Coordination of and assistance in national 
inspections
Adoption of inspection plans and programmes (within the 
JDPs)
Participation in joint inspection teams
Training and coordination of national 
inspectors
Preparation of training materials (core curricula, 
methodologies)
Teaching in training courses
Direct inspections Inspection report by Union inspector
Inspection operations involving third Adoption of JDPs with the other Member States involved
countries Participation in joint inspection teams
Controlling EU agencies222
Commission on one side, and, on the other side, from the national competent 
authorities, which previously used to autonomously exert their own enforce-
ment prerogatives. This implies that there ought to be some mechanisms 
through which EFCA’s activities are controlled. Otherwise, a short circuit in 
the mechanisms ensuring democracy may occur, either by hindering accounta-
bility or transparency upon which the systems of multilevel delegation30 are set 
up.31 In the case of EFCA’s inspection-related activities, these accountability 
mechanisms of control can be divided into personal, financial, institutional, 
judicial and public, as will be illustrated in the following.
3.1 Personal Accountability
By personal accountability we refer to the control mechanisms through which 
the members of an Agency’s bodies are appointed and dismissed. They are 
generally linked to the principal actor (in this case, the Commission), which 
decides upon their appointment and might remove them before due time if 
some political discrepancy arises during their mandate.
30 D. Coen and M. Thatcher (2008), ‘Network governance and multi-level dele-
gation: European networks of regulatory agencies’, Journal of Public Policy, 28(1): 
49–71; A. Schout (2018), EU Agencies after 25 Years: a Missed Opportunity to 
Enhance EU Governance, The Hague, Clingendael Policy Brief.
31 See Chapter 4 on accountability by Brandsma and Moser.
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The European Fisheries Control Agency’s inspecting powers 223
In the specific case of EFCA, its main units responsible for its activities are 
the Administrative Board (Articles 32–34 of Regulation 473), the Advisory 
Board (Article 40) and the Executive Director (Articles 38–39).
Focusing on the four sets of EFCA’s inspecting tasks, specific actors who 
are directly involved in carrying them out will be examined. For example, 
we may consider the actors involved in the adoption of JDPs, insofar as 
coordination activities of both national inspections and inspections involving 
third countries32 are foreseen therein. Therefore, it will be appropriate, for 
our research purposes, to look at how the actors involved in planning and 
implementing the inspector training activities are controlled, and by whom; in 
addition, we may consider EFCA staff members appointed as Union inspectors 
who carry out direct inspections or participate in joint inspection teams.
Regarding the adoption of JDPs, pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation 473, 
a draft is adopted by the Executive Director in consultation with the Member 
States concerned. The provision in the third paragraph of Article 13 also 
states that, if, while preparing a JDP, it emerges that there are not enough 
means of control and inspection available to achieve the JDP’s objectives, the 
Executive Director has a duty to notify the Member States concerned and the 
Commission.
As a personal control mechanism, the Executive Director is appointed by 
the Administrative Board based on her/his experience in the field of the CFP 
and fisheries controls and inspections, from a list of at least two candidates 
proposed by the Commission.33 The Executive Director’s term of office is 
five years as from her/his appointment, and it can be renewed once by pro-
posal of the Commission, to be approved by two-thirds of members of the 
Administrative Board. The latter, by the same majority, may also dismiss her/
him, upon request of the Commission or of one-third of its members. The 
Administrative Board therefore may control how the Executive Director takes 
her/his relevant decisions regarding JDPs and decide accordingly.
Regarding the actors in charge of adopting EFCA’s multiannual work 
programme – and its annual version – pursuant to Article 24, the multiannual 
work programme is adopted by the Administrative Board. It includes, amongst 
other things, the planned training operations for the reference period. The 
Administrative Board is composed of representatives of the Member States 
(one per country and an alternate in case of her/his absence) and six members 
from the Commission.34 Its members are appointed based on their expertise in 
32 Ongoing JDPs dealing with international cooperation are available at https:// 
www .efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ operational -coordination. 
33 Art. 39 of Regulation 473.
34 Ibid., Art. 33.
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the field of control and inspections, and their mandate, lasting five years, may 
be renewed. No provisions on the dismissal of members of the Administrative 
Board have been made.35
Direct inspections are carried out by EFCA’s staff members appointed as 
Union inspectors. Commission Implementing Regulation 404/2011 issued 
detailed rules for the application of the Union control system as established 
by the Control Regulation; it provides that the list of Union inspectors is to be 
adopted by the Commission, drawing on the notifications of Member States 
and of EFCA. In accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation 
404/2011, after the establishment of the initial list,36 Member States and 
EFCA must notify to the Commission yearly any amendment to the list they 
wish to introduce for the following calendar year, and the Commission must 
amend the list accordingly. Article 122 of the same Commission Implementing 
Regulation states that Union inspectors must comply with EU law and, as far 
as applicable, the national law of the Member State where the inspection takes 
place (or, in a case where it is conducted outside Union waters, of the flag 
Member State of the inspected vessel). They are provided with an identifica-
tion document issued by EFCA (or the Commission in the case where they are 
appointed by the latter). Nonetheless, there is no clear mechanism of personal 
control over the actions taken by Union inspectors in the event they do not 
comply with Commission Implementing Regulation 404/2011 while conduct-
ing their inspections. The same lack of mechanisms of personal control can be 
detected with respect to actions of EFCA’s staff members who are involved in 
joint inspection teams.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that, on 15 November 2018, a Code of 
Conduct entered into force; it applies to all persons participating in any of 
EFCA’s activities. The Code is binding (participants in EFCA’s activities have 
to sign a declaration that they will abide by it) and provides a set of standards to 
be met. In case of violation by an EFCA staff member, the Executive Director 
‘will take adequate measures in accordance with the Staff Regulations which 
may include the immediate removal of the EFCA staff member from the activ-
ity’ (Article 19, Code of Conduct).
3.2 Financial Accountability
Financial levers of accountability are forms of controls related to EFCA’s 
budget and how it is employed, according to the political evaluations of the 
35 M. Scholten (2014), The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 97.
36 Art. 119(1) of Regulation 404/2011.
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The European Fisheries Control Agency’s inspecting powers 225
institutions entitled to increase or decrease it. The political nexus is here 
clearly the one that ties financial capacity to the policy scope, which may bring 
about higher or lower autonomy to the actor under scrutiny. Therefore, its per-
formance will result in a specific political assessment on how its own financial 
resources might be confirmed, increased or reduced according to the financial 
authority’s overall evaluation.
EFCA carries out its inspection-related activities relying on a budget which, 
pursuant to Article 44 of Regulation 473, consists of:
(a) a contribution from the EU entered in the general budget of the EU 
(Commission section);
(b) charges for services provided by EFCA to Member States according to 
provisions of Regulation 473;
(c) charges for publications, training and other services provided by it.
The control exerted through the budget applies to all four of EFCA’s 
inspection-related activities.
As for the budget coming from the EU, it is granted by the Commission 
to EFCA through a complex procedure of approval.37 In detail, each year 
the Executive Director draws up a draft statement of estimates of EFCA’s 
revenues and expenditure for the coming financial year, on which basis each 
year the Administrative Board must produce a further draft statement of esti-
mates, to be forwarded, together with the provisional work programme, to the 
Commission. The latter, in turn, must forward it to the European Parliament 
and the Council (the ‘budgetary authority’) which will finally authorize the 
appropriations for the subsidy to EFCA. The final budget is then adopted by 
the Administrative Board and will become final only after the final adoption of 
the general budget of the EU.
In the event the Administrative Board means to implement any project 
that may have significant impacts on the approved budget, it must inform the 
Commission for the budgetary authority to be able to express an ‘opinion’ 
(Article 44(12) of Regulation 473) about it.
EFCA’s annual report is also subject to the European Court of Auditors’ 
review, pursuant to the provisions of Article 287 TFEU, according to Article 
32(2)(b) of Regulation 473.
3.3 Institutional Accountability
Institutional accountability mechanisms link EFCA to the other institutions 
and allow the former to inform the latter (and especially, though not exclu-
37 Cacciatore and Eliantonio (note 2 above) 181.
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sively, its principal, the Commission) about its past, ongoing and future 
activities – depending on their timing and purpose. Ex ante mechanisms aim 
to require prior permission to carry out specific actions; ex post mechanisms 
are those used to account for the way in which the resources are employed and 
carried out by the institutions entitled to confirm or withdraw political support 
according to the check’s results themselves.
Both ex ante and ex post reporting tools are foreseen regarding the activities 
of coordination of Member States’ inspections, training of inspectors, and 
assistance and coordination to inspections involving third countries.38 More 
specifically, ex ante and ex post reporting obligations are wide in scope since 
they cover almost all of EFCA’s tasks.
As regards the ex ante reporting tools, we may refer to the previously men-
tioned multiannual work programme, pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation 473, 
where the Administrative Board establishes its overall objectives, mandate, 
tasks, performance indicators and the priorities for each action over a five-year 
period. In the work programme’s latest version,39 it is possible to find detailed 
information regarding the adoption and implementation of JDPs for the current 
year and for the coming years, covering both information on the coordination 
of and assistance in national inspections and inspection-related operations 
involving third countries.40 The work programme also provides information on 
the training activities that are planned for the forthcoming period.41
As regards the ex post reporting tools, with specific reference to the JDPs, 
EFCA, according to Article 15 of Regulation 473, must communicate to the 
Parliament ‘an annual assessment of the effectiveness of each [JDP]’, together 
with an empirical assessment about the possibility that fishing activities are not 
compliant with applicable control measures. Such annual assessment must be 
communicated to the Parliament, the Commission and Member States. In addi-
tion, upon the European Parliament’s request, EFCA’s Executive Director is to 
provide ‘all information necessary for the smooth application of the discharge 
procedure for the financial year in question, as laid down in Article 261(3) of 
the Financial Regulation’.42 The JDPs’ annual reports provide accurate infor-
38 The same happens with reference to ESMA’s direct inspection powers (See 
Chapter 15 by van Rijsbergen and Simoncini).
39 EFCA (2018), Programming Document: Multiannual work programme 
2019–2020 and Annual work programme 2019, Vigo, European Fisheries Control 
Agency.
40 Ibid. See, for example, the table on ‘Objectives, indicators, expected outcomes 
and outputs’ on p. 34, for in-depth information accounting for the agency’s participa-
tion in inspections. As regards operations involving third countries, see, for example, 
the information provided in the table on p. 14, or pp. 18ff. 
41 Ibid., pp. 20–23 and passim throughout the document, for each objective.
42 Art. 45(10) of Regulation 473.
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mation on activities and data both on the joint inspections conducted, in which 
EFCA’s members have also taken part, and on the training courses organized 
and material produced over the previous year.43
Again, with reference to ex post reporting obligations, according to 
Regulation 47344 EFCA’s Administrative Board must adopt every year the 
general report on the Agency’s overall activity and forward it to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the 
Member States. The report is not subject to a review clause,45 but only to an 
evaluation clause.46
As for inspection activities carried out by EFCA members acting as Union 
inspectors, Article 123 of Commission Implementing Regulation 404/2011 
sets out that they must submit a daily summary on their inspection activities, 
including specific information listed therein, to the competent authorities of 
the Member States (i.e. to the flag Member State of the inspected EU fishing 
vessel). However, there seems to be no such obligation in the legislation for 
EFCA’s staff members who participate in joint inspection teams.
Direct inspections carried out by EFCA members are outside the scope of 
institutional accountability but, as will be clarified below, this should not be 
considered to be a gap in the system of controls, especially in those acting 
ex ante, because of the very nature of inspections, which cannot always be 
planned in advance so as to be validated by the delegating actors.
3.4 Judicial Accountability
By judicial accountability we mean the mechanisms for judicial control of the 
actions of EFCA, namely in direct actions for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU, or through the indirect control provided by the preliminary question of 
validity under Article 267 TFEU, or in actions for failure to act under Article 
265 TFEU and actions for Union liability under Article 340 TFEU.
These mechanisms of control are relevant in the following way: EFCA’s 
enforcement policies contained in the JDPs, its training activities,  its inves-
tigation activities and final investigation report and its participation in joint 
teams (in the framework of its cooperation with third countries) could be chal-
lenged directly by a vessel master in an action for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU, or indirectly through a preliminary question of validity under Article 
43 See, for example, the latest JDP Mediterranean 12-months report, available on 
EFCA’s website at https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ sites/ default/ files/ atoms/ files/ Q4 -MED 
%20web %20report -2018 .pdf, for an assessment of the sort of activities accounted for.
44 Regulation 473, Art. 32(2)(b).
45 Scholten (note 35 above) 421.
46 See also Chapter 16 by Timmermans and Chamon on the SRB.
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267 TFEU. The failure to undertake those same activities could potentially 
be the subject matter of an action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU, 
brought, for example, by a competitor of a specific vessel master or an NGO 
concerned with fisheries conservation.
As regards the direct and indirect challenge to EFCA’s actions, the starting 
point is constituted by the requirement of a ‘reviewable act’, which, for the 
purposes of an annulment action, concretely excludes from judicial review 
acts and actions which are not ‘intended to have legal effects’.47 Furthermore, 
specifically concerning acts of agencies, Article 263 TFEU provides that these 
can be reviewed if they are ‘intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties’. This limitation entails that EFCA’s enforcement policies and any 
training activities will not be considered a reviewable act before the EU courts 
because they are not capable of affecting an individual’s legal sphere, but 
constitute a mere statement of objectives or an information-sharing activity.
With regard to inspection reports and activities in the case of direct inspec-
tions, which constitute a preparatory step in the decision-making process 
concluded with a sanction at the national level, in light of the IBM case law,48 
and specific case law relating to inspection in the field of competition law,49 
reviewability is also excluded. A fortiori reviewability is excluded for the mere 
‘participation’ of an EFCA official in a joint inspection team, as in this case the 
contribution of EFCA’s officials is ‘diluted’ in the inspection activity which 
sees the cooperation of national inspectors and, where applicable, inspectors 
from third countries. It should also be pointed out that, unlike the case of, for 
example, competition law,50 no prior authorization is required by the applica-
ble legislation either to carry out a direct inspection or to participate in a joint 
inspection team.
47 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) ECLI: EU: C: 1971: 32, para. 42.
48 In the IBM case, the CJEU held that a measure is reviewable only if it is ‘defini-
tively laying down the position of the Commission or the Council in the conclusion of 
that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for a final deci-
sion’. Case 60/81, International Business Machines Corporation v Commission ECLI: 
EU: C: 1981: 264, para. 10.
49 ‘The investigation procedure referred to … is not aimed at terminating an 
infringement or declaring that an act is unlawful, but has the sole object of enabling 
the Commission to gather the necessary information to check the actual existence and 
scope of a given factual and legal situation.’ Case T-9/97 Elf Atochem SA v Commission 
ECLI: EU: T: 1997: 83, para. 22. See for similar considerations concerning an OLAF 
report, Case T-309/03, Camós Grau v Commission ECLI: EU: T: 2006: 110, paras. 
48–58.
50 See Art. 20(7) of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1-25.
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The same inspection-related activities could potentially be challenged indi-
rectly through a preliminary question of validity, where there is a national act 
taken in implementation of them.
Specifically, however, this option materializes only in the case of direct 
inspections (and possibly in the case of the JDPs): a vessel master could, 
for example, bring an action against a national measure imposing a sanction 
and in those national proceedings challenge the validity of an underlying EU 
measure, such as the inspection report of an EFCA official acting as Union 
inspector. According to the case law of the CJEU, the range of measures 
which can be challenged indirectly through a question of validity is wider than 
those which are amenable to judicial review in direct actions since it is held to 
include ‘all acts of the institutions without exception’.51
As regards actions for failure to act, the main hurdle to controlling EFCA’s 
failure to undertake inspection-related activities is the case law of the CJEU 
on the basis of which failures to act can only be challenged when an EU insti-
tution is under a clear obligation to act.52 In light of the fact that the applicable 
provisions do not seem to establish any obligation for Union inspectors to 
carry out inspections or participate in joint inspection teams, or for EFCA 
to draft JDPs or provide training, it seems very unlikely that an action for 
failure to act, brought, for example, by a vessel master who has been subject 
to an inspection (and who claims that his or her competitor should equally be 
inspected) or a concerned NGO, would be successful. This is because of the 
discretion granted to EFCA as to how to enforce the CFP. In addition, it should 
be pointed out that failures to act by an EU institution or body cannot be the 
subject matter of a preliminary question of validity.53
Finally, as regards EU liability, an action for non-contractual liability is 
specifically provided for in Article 30 of Regulation 473. On this basis, it 
might be possible for an applicant fulfilling the liability requirements provided 
by EU law to request compensation for damage incurred as a consequence 
of the possible illegality of EFCA’s inspection-related activities.54 However, 
given the large margin of discretion attributed to EFCA when carrying out 
51 Case 322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles ECLI: EU: C: 1989: 
646, para. 8. Case T-193/04 Tillack v Commission ECLI: EU: T: 2006: 292, para. 80.
52 Case T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v Commission ECLI: EU: T1998: 206, para. 
71; Case T-127/98 UPS Europe v Commission ECLI: EU: T1999: 167, para. 34.
53 Case C-68/95 T Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und 
Ernährung ECLI: EU: C: 1996: 458, para. 53.
54 See e.g. Case T-309/03 Camós Grau v Commission ECLI: EU: T: 2006: 110, paras. 
75–81, in which a report by OLAF terminating an anti-fraud investigation was held to 
be an act capable of giving rise to EU liability.
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such inspection-related activities, it is unlikely that any claim for liability will 
be successful.55
However, it should be pointed out that, while an applicant could potentially 
bring an action for the damage incurred as a consequence of an inspection 
activity by EFCA, this avenue is not open in the case of a lack of action, as 
actions for liability as a consequence of a failure to act can only be brought 
where an institution has infringed a legal obligation to act.56
3.5 Public Accountability
By public accountability we mean all those mechanisms allowing for a direct 
interaction between EFCA and the public, so that the latter can be kept updated 
on the former’s activities and take an active part in them. These forms of 
control are mostly concerned with transparency mechanisms, also aiming to 
open the decisional process to all interested parties, but they may also be ex 
post tools used to make an agency account for how resources were employed 
and policies carried out (see Chapter 9 on transparency by Buijze).
As regards transparency and access to EFCA’s documents, Regulation 
1049/2001 on public access to all EU documents applies to documents held by 
EFCA. Therefore, according to Article 41(5) of Regulation 473,
[d]ecisions taken by the Agency pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 may give rise to the lodging of a complaint to the Ombudsman or form 
the subject of an action before the Court of Justice, under Articles 228 and 263 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Moreover, ‘[t]he Commission shall have full access to all information collected 
by the Agency. The Agency shall furnish any information and an evaluation of 
that information to the Commission at its request and in the form specified by 
it’ (Article 43(1)), and to the Member States only insofar as they are directly 
concerned by specific activities carried out by EFCA and by the documents 
delivered in association with those activities.
Because the publication of the multiannual work programme (ex ante) and 
of the annual report (ex post) also serve the purposes of transparency vis-à-vis 
the public, public accountability covers all the actions accounted for therein: 
55 This conclusion is based on the established case law of the CJEU, according to 
which, in order to incur liability, an EU institution needs to have ‘gravely and mani-
festly disregarded the limits of its discretion’. Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and others 
v Commission ECLI: EU: C: 2000: 361, para. 43.
56 Case T-196/99 Area Cova SA and others v Council and Commission ECLI: EU: 
T2001: 281, para. 84.
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inspections (EU and third countries) coordinated by the EFCA, and training 
activities. As regards direct inspections, although it is not possible for the 
public to freely access information on a specific inspection (i.e. to access 
an inspection report and related documents), aggregated data on the overall 
number of inspections carried out regarding specific operations are available in 
EFCA’s reports (both the annual general report and the JDP-specific reports). 
It is also possible to know how many inspections out of the total carried out 
report suspected (or ascertained) infringements, how the joint teams were com-
posed and the types of infringements detected during the control operations.57
With regard to training activities, it is also worth mentioning that the 
Agency has a dedicated online e-learning platform,58 where registered people 
can access information on the training calendar and more.
4. CONCLUSIONS: EFCA’S INSPECTION 
ACTIVITIES – A BLIND SPOT IN THE SYSTEM 
OF JUDICIAL CONTROLS?
Drawing on the analysis carried out above, Table 12.2 summarizes the types of 
controls available for each of the inspection-related activities of EFCA.
From this overview, it appears that, except for the mechanisms of financial 
control, which cover all four inspection-related functions of the Agency, the 
other four types of controls (personal, institutional, judicial and public) are 
lacking in some cases.
More specifically, activities of coordination and assistance in national 
inspections – which represent a large share of the tasks which EFCA carries 
out daily – entail some control phases either through the ‘political’ relation-
ships between the actors involved, who personally account to other institutions 
for the decisions made regarding such activities, or through the institutional 
link which allows for both ex ante and ex post checks of, respectively, pro-
grammes and reports; moreover, they are exposed to public control insofar 
as these programmes and reports are mostly public and available on EFCA’s 
website. However, because of either the largely political nature of these activ-
ities (in the case of the JDPs) or the ‘diluted’ and non-formalized nature of the 
share of EFCA’s action (in the case of the participation of EFCA coordinators 
in national joint inspections), it is not likely that a form of judicial control will 
be available to interested parties. While this gap is not problematic in the case 
57 See, for example, the latest JDP Mediterranean 12-months report (note 43 above), 
or that related to the JDP Baltic Sea, at https:// www .efca .europa .eu/ sites/ default/ files/ 
atoms/ files/ 2018 %20 - %20THE %20BALTIC %20SEA %20JOINT %20CAMPAIGN 
%20 - %2012M %20REP %20WEB .pdf. 
58 Available at https:// training .efca .europa .eu/ login/ index .php. 
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Per Fin Ins Jud Pub
Coordination of and assistance 
in national inspections
Adoption of inspection plans and 
programmes (within the JDPs)
 √  √  √   √
Participation in joint inspection teams  √  √  √   √
Training and coordination of 
national inspectors
Preparation of training materials 
(core curricula, methodologies)
  √  √   √
Teaching in training courses   √  √   √
Direct inspections Inspection report   √   √  √
Inspection operations involving 
third countries
Adoption of JDPs with the other 
Member States involved
 √  √  √   √
Participation in joint inspection teams  √  √  √   √
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of the JDPs as the lack of judicial accountability is compensated for by a strong 
presence of other forms of controls which are, in fact, more appropriate to the 
political nature of this activity, the same cannot be said for the participation 
of EFCA coordinators in national joint inspections. In this case, the lack of 
judicial accountability constitutes a true gap in the control system as the other 
forms of controls are ill-suited for bringing to light certain possible illegalities 
in the inspection activities (such as possible fundamental rights violations), for 
which a court seems to be the most adequate forum.
Almost the same applies for the inspection activities involving third coun-
tries in that most provisions are the same as those related to the coordination 
activities: this holds true with regard to the actors in charge of taking decisions 
in both fields and to the documents – and related procedures of adoption 
– through which these operations are planned and reported. Here specific 
mention must be made of the JDPs, which are the main tool for planning both 
EU and extra-EU joint operations. Finally, again the political nature of the 
JDPs and the low level of institutionalization of EFCA’s activities in joint 
inspection teams, stand in the way of a form of judicial control over these 
activities. As a consequence the same considerations made above with respect 
to the gaps in judicial accountability apply to this task as well.
An even lighter regime of controls characterizes the training and coordina-
tion of inspectors’ activities, which benefit from an institutional and public 
control system (besides the financial one), but to which no EFCA member has 
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to personally respond. In other words, no direct and personal responsibility is 
acknowledged regarding the training of inspectors, but it is EFCA as a body 
that accounts for them ahead of the other institutions, the public and the EU 
financial authority. As a mere information dissemination activity, naturally 
no judicial control is provided for these tasks. Nonetheless, this does not look 
like an accountability gap insofar as such activities do not imply any binding 
decision addressed to trained inspectors, and the purely ‘political’ assessment 
through institutional accountability seems the most appropriate form of 
control.
Finally, direct inspections, which are the most sensitive and tricky function 
with which EFCA is entrusted when it comes to inspections – because they 
entail direct enforcement of EU laws and an immediate impact on the regula-
tees, with likely judicial outcomes – appear at first glance as the least covered 
function in terms of control. In carrying out these functions EFCA only under-
goes financial and judicial controls. Nonetheless, even judicial control is only 
present in a limited way since only the indirect route of the preliminary ques-
tion of validity is available to applicants; the failure to undertake an inspection 
cannot, either directly or indirectly, be subject to judicial control, and the 
liability route, though theoretically open, is in fact impracticable. Hence, it can 
be concluded that a worrisome gap in the control system can be identified with 
respect to this task.
To conclude, while financial accountability is confirmed to be a crucial 
means for the EU’s oversight activity on EFCA,59 and one supposed to coun-
terbalance gaps in other forms of ‘political’ control, judicial control is almost 
entirely lacking with reference to all EFCA’s inspection-related tasks, except, 
to some extent, for direct inspections. Crucially, and as a matter for further 
research, the participation of EFCA staff members in joint inspection teams, 
both in the EU and abroad, seems to be a complete blind spot for the purposes 
of judicial control. Given its relevance for the purposes of potential fundamen-
tal rights violations and the difficulties in allocating responsibility for such 
violations, it is essential to continue research into the practical operation of the 
joint inspection systems in the process of European integration.
59 Cacciatore and Eliantonio (note 2 above).
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